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White: The Doctrine of Public Use in Eminent Domain in Montana

The Doctrine of Public Use inEminent
Domain inMontana
Eminent domain is a power inherent in all sovereignties and is
defined as the right of the nation or the state or those to whom the power
has been lawfully delegated, to appropriate for public use every description
of private property upon the payment of just compensation. 1 The exercise
of this power by the federal government is limited by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,2 while its exercise by the
3
states is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
as well as by the constitutional provisions of the states. The power itself
can be exercised only by virtue of legislative authority, and whether or not
the exercise of the power under such legislative enactments is within the
4
federal and state constitutional provisions is a judicial question.
Few states have constitutional provisions stating that private property
cannot be taken for a private use, but all courts, although they offer
different reasons for their conclusions, are unanimous in holding that such
cannot be done. Although courts are in agreement as to this principle,
here unanimity ceases, and what will constitute a public use has been
provocative of many and divergent views. Some of these decisions may
be reconciled by the different constitutional and legislative provisions in
the various states. In others, the divergency may be due to the difference
in climatic and geographical conditions, and in still others the results do
not appear so divergent after consideration of the localities' changing neec.
Nevertheless, there are decisions which cannot be reconciled. There are
those courts which hold that public use is that public benefit which is
material and necessary to the development of the natural resources of the
lCity of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1912) 32 S. Ct. 267, 22
U. S. 390, 56 L. Ed. 481.
2
U. S. CONST. 5th Amend. provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

.

.

. Nor shall

private property be taken for a public use without just compensation."
3
U. S. CONST. 14th Amend. provides: ". . . Nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
4

Komposh v. Powers (1926) 75 Mont. 493, 244 P. 298, 48 S. Ct. 156,
275 U. S. 504, 73 L. Ed. 396.
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state. An opposite view is that to constitute a public use, the public or
some appreciable part thereof must assume control of the property taken,
or that the right to the use of the property must pass to the state or
the public.
Perhaps the most common instances of the exercise of eminent domain in the early history of our country arose in the New England states,
where land adjacent to streams was condemned in order to allow for the
erection of dams to furnish power to grist mills and saw mills. The most
frequently cited case involving this situation is that of Olmstead v. Camp,6
a Connecticut decision, whegein the court stated:
"... . Any appropriating of private property under its right of eminent
domain for purposes of great advantage to the community is a taking
for a public use."
The court held that although one individual was to obtain direct gain
or benefit from the operation of the mill, the community being in need
of it, the condemnation was justified.
Another early decision is The Bellona Company's Case,6 in which
the court in speaking of the public use requirement in eminent domain,
expressed itself as follows:
"The exercise of this power of the government of the state is not
confined to those cases only in which- the private property taken
is to be applied immediately, directly and exclusively to some public
use, as to the making of an open highway or the like; for it is
enough if it clearly appears that the application of such private
property to the proposed new use will be attended by a material
public benefit; which would not be so immediately and effectively
produced."
Similar definitions of the term are numerous among the early decisions. 7
A problem similar to that presented by these early decisions, and
one which arises frequently in the western states, is whether land may
be condemned for the purpose of constructing an irrigation ditch. In a
California decision, Graverly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope &,Talbot Land Co.,8
the plaintiff, a mutual irrigation company, sought to condemn a right of
6(1886) 33 Conn. 532, 89 Am. D. 221.
3 Bland 442 (Md.).
See: Brown v. Beotty (1857) 34 Miss. 227, condemnation for railroad
right of way; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head (1876) 56 N. Homp. 386,
condemnation of land necessitated by erection of o dam for mill power
purposes; Concord R. Co. v. Greely (1845) 17 N. Homp. 47, condemnation for railroad right of way; Talbot v. Hudson (1860) 16 Gray
417 (Mass.), flooding of land by mill dam.
8(1918)36 Cal. App." 717, 178 P. 150.

6(1831)
7
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way through defendant's land for the construction of an irrigation ditch
designed to irrigate seventeen thousand acres of land. Plaintiff relied on
a statute declaring irrigation to be a public use. The court held that since
the irrigation contemplated by the plaintiff was to be devoted to his
lands but to none others, it did not qualify under the statute.
In the Oregon case of Smith v. Cameron,9 plaintiff sought to enlarge an irrigation ditch already existing on the defendant's land to allow
irrigation of his 160 acres of semi-arid farm land. Here, plaintiff relied
on a statute providing for a right to enlarge an existing irrigation system
on the land of another to provide irrigation of petitioner's land. The
Oregon Supreme Court held, as did the California Supreme Court, that
there was no public use involved. In each of the two cases just mentioned
the court defined public use in terms of a duty devolving on the individual
or corporation to furnish the public with the use intended and took the
position that the public must be entitled as a matter of right to use or
enjoy the property taken.
The above cases pronounce a doctrine which has likewise been
adopted in the state of Washington. In the case of Healy Lumber Co. v.
Morris,1 0 plaintiff sought to condepin certain land and waters for a logging road and waterway to enable it to carry on logging operations on its
property. It relied on a statute which authorized the condemnation of
land for logging roads, water-courses, etc., to enable the owner of timber
to reach a railroad, highway or stream. The Washington Supreme Court,
in holding the statute unconstitutional, said that it violated the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of private property for a private
use. The court conceded that there were decisions which held that a
public use existed where the community or state would enjoy a material
benefit from such condemnation, but added that it felt that such interpretation was a dangerous and unwarranted extension of the doctrine, and
one which tended to encroach upon private rights. 11
9(1922) 106 Ore. 1, 210 P. 716, 27 A.L.R. 510.
10(1903)33 Wash. 490, 74 P. 781, 63 L.R.A. 820, 99 Am. St. Rep. 964.
11
Cases in accord: Anderson v. Smith-Powers (1914i 710 Ore. 276, 139
P. 736, L.R.A. 1916B 1089; Hammond Lumber Co. v. Public Service
Comm. (1920) 96 Ore. 595, 189 P. 639, 9 A.L.R. 1223; Witham v.
Osburn (1873) 4 Ore. 319, 18 Am. Rep. 287; Lorenz v. Jacob (1883)
63 Cal. 73; Thayer v. Calif. Development Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 117,
128 P. 21; State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.. v. Superior
Court of Snohomish County et al. (1925) 133 Wash. 308, 233 P. 651;
State ex rel. Chelan Electric Co. v. Superior Court for Chelan County

(1927)

142 Wash. 270, 253 P. 115, 58 A.L.R. 779.
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However, there are other jurisdictions which have taken a different
view. In the case of Nash v. Clark,12 plaintiff sought to condemn a
right of way in a ditch owned by the defendants for the purpose of conveying water to his land. The pertinent provision of the statute upon
which the plaintiff based his right of action was as follows:
"When any person desires to convey water for irrigation or other
beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch already constructed
on the property of another that can be enlarged to carry the required
ditch
quantity, then such person shall have the right to enlarge the 13
by compensating the owner for any damages caused thereby"
The court, in recognizing the fact that there are two lines of authority
as to what constitutes a public use, said that the group of decisions adopting a more liberal construction of the term "public use" is more in harmony with enlightened public policy, and a liberal interpretation of the
term is more conducive to individual and public advancement. The court
held that in view of the climatic conditions of many sections of the West
and in view of the beneficial results accomplished by irrigation in such
localities, it would be an insurmountable barrier to the development of
the state to adopt a narrow interpretation of what constitutes a public
use-a view, which the court said, was never intended by the constitution.
Not all the decisions in Montana's neighboring states have had
to do with condemnation for irrigation purposes. The Idaho case of
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson14 concerned the condemnation of twelve
acres of defendant's land which would be flooded by plaintiff's dam, the
erection of which was necessary to create an even flow of water in a
stream used to transport logs to plaintiff's mill. The constitutional provision upon which plaintiff based his case provided:
"The necessary use of lands for the construction of reservoirs or
storage basins for the purpose of irrigation or for the right of way
for the construction of ditches-to carry water to the place of use
for any useful purpose-or any other use necessary to the complete
development of the natural resources of the state is hereby declared
to be a public use." 1 5
The applicable statute provided:
"Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain
may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses . . . for
storing and floating logs on streams not navigable."' 6
12(1904)27 Utah 158, 75
Rep. 953, 198 U. S. 361,
3

P. 371, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 208, 101 Am. St.
25 S. Ct. 676, 49 L. Ed. 1085.

1 Rev. Stat. Utah 1898, 1278.
14(1906) 12 Ida. 769, 88 P. 426, 118Am. St. Rep. 233.
151DAHO CONST. Art. I, 14.
16 Rev. Stat. Ida. 1887,

5210.
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After holding that the stream was not navigable the year-round and that
the plaintiff's cause could thereby qualify under the constitution and the
statutes, the court went on to say that lumber was one of the state's leading
natural resources, for the development of which the power of eminent
17
domain might be exercised.
Montana has been classified by text authorities and encyclopedias
as being within that group of states adopting the more liberal interpretation
of what constitutes a public use. The Montana constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation 18 and that no person will be deprived of his property without due
process of law. 19 In addition, Art. III, Sec. 15, provides:
"The use of all water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be
appropriated for sale, rental, distribution, or other beneficial use,
and the right of way over the lands of others, for all drains, ditches,
flumes, canals, and aqueducts, necessarily used in connection therewith, as well as the sites for reservoirs necessary for the collecting
and storing the same, shall be held to be a public use. Private roads
may be opened in the manner to be prescribed by law, but in every
case the necessity of the road and the amount of the damage to be
sustained by the opening thereof, shall be first determined by a
jury, and such amount, together with the expenses of the proceeding, shall be paid by the person to be benefited."
Under these constitutional provisions the legislature enacted what is now
R.C.M. 1935, Sec. 9934, wherein are designated the public uses for which
20
eminent domain may be exercised.
17 Cases in accord: Oury v. Goodwin (1891) 3 Ariz. 255, 26 P. 376;
Ortez v. Hansen (1905) 35 Colo. 78, 83 P. 964; Dayton Gold & Silver
Min. Co. v. Seowell (1876)

11 Nev. 394; State ex rel. Stand. Slag Co.

v. Fifth Judicial Court (1943) 62 Nev. 113, 143 P. (2d) 476; Strickley
v. Highland Boy Min: Co. (1904) 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, 1 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 956, 3 Ann. Cas. I110, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711.
18
Art. III, Sec. 14.
19Art. III, Sec. 27.
2
OPar. I covers uses authorized by the government of the United States.
Condemnations for the direct benefit of the state or political subdivisions
thereof which are comprehended within Pars. 2, 3 and 9 would be upheld even in those jurisdictions adhering to the strict interpretation of
public use. It is to be noted, however, that the part of Par. 3 allowing
the raising of banks of streams, removing obstruction therefrom, and
widening, deepening, or straightening their channels, does not specifically
provide that such changes may be made only for the benefit of the state
or a subdivision thereof, and there has been no Montana decision indicating whether this particular public use would be so limited. (State ex
rel. Livingston v. District Court, 90 Mont. 191, 300 P. 916, allowed
the condemnation of a small tract of farm land so that the channel of
a river might be changed, thereby avoiding the construction of two highway bridges. This condemnation, however, was at the instance of the
County). Several other paragraphs of the statute provide for public"
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One of the earlier cases in Montana involving eminent domain and
the question of public use is Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Montana U. Ry.
Ry. Co., 2 1 where plaintiff sought to condemn defendant's right of way
to the extent of allowing its lines to cross defendant's tracks and spurs.
Both railroads were interested in the transportation of ore from certain
mines. The court, holding for the plaintiff, said:
"In ingrafting upon the law of this jurisdiction the doctrine that
the magnitude of the interests involved may properly become a
determining factor in sustaining the right of the railroad to construct lateral tracks, branches, and spurs to mines and mining works
as public uses, by virtue of the law of eminent domain, we are
always duly mindful, not only of the constitutional guaranty of
the individual right of possessing and protecting property, but are
equally impressed with the declaration that 'the good of the whole'
is the very foundation of the constitution. . . . The force of the
principle might vary in different communities. What cogently applies in Montana with its mountains and quartz would be an absurd
process of reasoning to urge in Louisiana .... Therefore to correctly
define what the force is in the case before us, it is imminently
reasonable and appropriate that the conditions of the whole people
be considered."
The court admitted that other routes could be found .for the plaintiff's
railroad, but in each case the obstacles to be encountered would have
made its construction prohibitive. The court concluded that, since the
mining industry is one of the important industries of the state, and one
in which vast numbers of people are employed and upon which numerous
others are indirectly dependent, the condemnation should be allowed.
uses which are essentially of a public utility nature and such uses are
unquestionably 'sufficient to justify condemnation. These are Pars. 7, 8
and I1, which designate telephone or electric light lines, telegraph lines,
and electric power lines as public uses. Pars. 4. 5, 12 and 13 are
primarily for the benefit of the mining, agricultural and lumbering
industries. In the light of the Montana decisions discussed and cited
herein, it seems reasonable to anticipate that these provisions would
be upheld as constitutional. However, since the condemnations in the
aid of those industries will directly benefit individuals or corporations,
their constitutionality would be questionable in jurisdictions where the
public benefit element is not .a test. The constitutionality of condemnation for "private roads leading from highways to residences and
farms," found in Par. 6, was upheld in Komposh v. Powers, 75 Mont.

493, 244 P. 298, 275 U. S. 504, 48 S. Ct.. 156, 72 L. Ed. 396. Par.
10, which provides for tramway lines, has not been interpreted by the
Montana Supreme Court. If the tramway were to be used to transport
ore and lumber from places of procurement, it could be justified as a
public use in Montana, on the basis of its being a necessary facility in
the operations of a major industry.
21 (1895) 16 Mont. 504, 41 P. 232, 50 Am. St. Rep. 508, 31 L.R.A. 298.
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Two years later (1897) the Supreme Court decided Ellinghouse v.

Taylor.2 2 In this case, plaintiff, proceeding under a legislative act passed
in 1891, sought to condemn a right of way across defendant's land for an
irrigation ditch. Defendant contended that the statute upon which plaintiff based his right of condemnation was unconstitutional in that it permitted a taking for a private use, and was therefore invalid under Art.
III, Sec. 15, of the Montana Constitution. The defendant relied upon
a construction given a substantially similar constitutional provision in the
California case of Lorenz v. Jacob.23 The Montana court took the
position that a much narrower interpretation of the term public use had
been followed in California than the Montana court cared to agree with.
The court said that public use is not limited to situations where the persons exercising the power have bound themselves to a direct discharge
of a duty to the people at large, in the discharge of which, people are
to derive a direct benefit, as, for example, the situation of the common
carriers who are bound to transport passengers and freight without discrimination. The court took the position that the right of eminent domain
might be exercised where, the public had no direct interest in the operations, whose main end was mere private gain and where the benefit to
the people at large could result only from the increase in wealth and the
development of the natural resources of the state. In a more recent case
the court reiterated its definition of public use. In Helena Power Commission v. Spratt,24 plaintiff sought to appropriate several tracts of land
to be flooded by construction of a dam to be built across the Missouri
river. Defendant contended that the taking was not a public use. The
court, adopting the views expressed in Ellingbouse v. Taylor,25 stated that
the furnishing of electric power for use in mines and smelters was as
great an aid in the development of those industries as was the taking
of land for a road to transport machinery, or a ditch to carry water to
farm land.
Kipp v. Daley26 . was an action where the plaintiffs sought an
injunction against a corporation to restrain its construction and operation
of a railroad line on a public thoroughfare in the city of Butte, on which
the plaintiffs were abutting property owners. The city council, under
authority of a statute which gave the city exclusive control and power
22 (1897) 19 Mont. 492, 48 P. 757.
23(1883) 63 Col. 73.
24(1907) 35 Mont. 108, 88 P. 773.
25

See Note 22, supra.

26(1910) 41 Mont. 509, 110 P. 237.
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to regulate the use of the city streets, had passed an ordinance authorizing
such construction. The plaintiffs claimed that they had property rights
in the street which would be damaged. The court admitted the existence
of such property right but held that the construction of the railroad, being
essential to defendants in the carrying on of mining operations, an industry which was not only a dominant one in Montana but also one upon
which many other business enterprises were dependent, was a public use.
Much is to be said in favor of the view adopted in Montana. It is
submitted that it is a view which, while preserving the right of private
property, is elastic enough to allow the power of eminent domain to be
exercised in a manner most beneficial to private and public interests alike.
A study of the cases indicates that the courts, in adopting the narrow
view of the doctrine, do not concern themselves with whether or not the
condemnation sought will result in public benefit, nor do they hold that
the public benefit to accrue is inconsequential. Each case is disposed of
by the observation that since the individual who seeks to condemn stands
to gain the direct benefits, the use thereby becomes private. The result
would seem to be that any development of a natural resource, through
the powers conferred by eminent domain, must be accomplished by the
state itself and not through the medium of individual enterprise.
Of course, no one would contend that any advancement of public
interest is a justification for the taking of private property or that public
benefit is synonomous with public use. Yet it is difficult to conceive how
a distinct line of separation can be drawn between public benefit and
public use. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a test of public use, and, while
emphasizing the great caution necessary to be shown, has pointed out
that there are times and places in which the public welfare could not be
promoted without requiring concessions from individuals to each other
upon just compensation. 2 7 This is particularly significant today when the
preservation and development of our natural resources is so vital to our
public welfare.
27

Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co. (1906) 200 U. S. 527, 26 S. Ct.
301, 50 L. Ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cos. 1174. This case involved a proceeding
by a mining corporation to condemn a right of way for an aerial bucket
line across a placer mining claim of the defendants. Plaintiffs' mining
claim was in a high mountain region, and to transport ore to a railway
below it built a bucket line supported by four movable towers, each occupying an area seven and a half feet square on defendant's land. The
condemnation was allowed.
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61

The term "public use" can be properly applied only if considered
as a relative term. A proceeding under the power of eminent domain is
in its nature equitable, and as such the court should weigh all interests
involved. A proper result can be reached only after considering whether
or not the enterprise necessitating the condemnation will promote the
public welfare, and, bearing in mind the high value placed upon the right
of private property by the spirit as well as the letter of the constitution,
whether such public welfare justifies the condemnation of that private
property. Such a test of public use can be applied equally well in any
jtirisdiction, regardless of climatic or geographical conditions or other
factors. Such a test is flexible and when properly applied will not unjustly infringe the rights of the individual, but will serve the purpose for
which it was intended.
Charles R. White.
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